Aims: Social decision making has recently been evaluated in alcohol use disorder (AUD) using the ultimatum game (UG) task, suggesting a possible deficit in aversive emotion regulation elicited by the unfairness during this task. Despite the relevance to relapse of this possible faulty regulation, the brain correlates of the UG in AUD are unknown. Methods: In total, 23 AUD and 27 healthy controls (HC) played three consecutive fMRI runs of the UG, while behavioral and brain responses were recorded. Results: Overall, acceptance rate of unfair offers did not differ between groups, but there was a difference in the rate of behavioral change across runs. We found significant anterior insula (aINS) activation in both groups for both fair and unfair conditions, but only HC showed a trend towards increased activation during unfair vs. fair offers. There were not overall whole-brain betweengroup significant differences. We found a trend of signal attenuation, instead of an increase, in the aINS for AUD when compared to HC during the third run, which is consistent with our recent findings of selective insula atrophy in AUD. Conclusion: We found differential group temporal dynamics of behavioral response in the UG. The HC group had a low acceptance rate for unfair offers in the first two runs that increased markedly for the third run; whereas the AUD group was consistent in their rejection of unfair offers across the three runs. We found a strong significant decrease in neural response across runs for both groups. Short summary: This fMRI study of UG in alcohol use disorder found behavioral group differences in acceptance rate across runs, which together with significant BOLD-signal decrease across runs in UG-related regions in both groups, highlights the impairment of strategy in AUD and the effect of repetitive exposure to unfairness in this task.
INTRODUCTION
Alcohol use disorder (AUD), a major cause of disability worldwide (Whiteford et al., 2013) , is characterized by a chronic relapsing course (McLellan et al., 2000) . A hallmark of addictive disorders is maladaptive decision making, including the tendency to continue seeking and taking alcohol despite adverse consequences. Individuals with AUD demonstrate an impairment in inter-temporal decision making, preferring small, immediate monetary rewards, over more advantageous larger, delayed monetary rewards (MacKillop et al., 2011) . Individuals with AUD also make more risky decisions, even after periods of long-term abstinence (Fein et al., 2004; Noel et al., 2007) .
Less focus has been placed on the influence of social context on decision making in AUD. Recently, we have suggested that impairments in social cognition may be a key feature of addiction (Heilig et al., 2016) . Social interactions influence drinking in a complex manner, either by promoting relapse (Zywiak et al., 2003) , or by providing positive effects on recovery through social support (Maisto et al., 2006) . Of note, social stressors are among the most common relapse triggers (Brownell et al., 1986) , while negative emotions resulting from the stress of social exclusion are associated with activation of a brain network that includes the insula (Eisenberger, 2012) .The ultimatum game (UG), a behavioral economics task, can be used to evaluate the effect of social interactions on rational decision making (Frith and Singer, 2008) . In the UG, two players, a proposer and a responder, must divide a sum of money. The proposer suggests a division of money between him/herself and the responder. The responder then must accept or reject the offer suggested by the proposer. If the responder accepts, the money is split accordingly; if not, neither player receives any money. In the UG, when offers are considered 'unfair', i.e. when the responder would receive <30% (70:30 split), they are often rejected (Gabay et al., 2014) . This conflicts with dispassionate self-interest, which dictates that all offers be accepted to maximize monetary gains. Therefore, the UG may involve competition between impulsive emotional processing and higher order executive processing, each biasing decision making in opposite directions (Rilling et al., 2008; Brevers et al., 2013) .
Receiving unfair offers during the UG is associated with negative emotions; unfair offers reliably result in the activation of the anterior insula (aINS) (Gabay et al., 2014) , a region highly responsive to negative emotions (Goldin et al., 2008) . Furthermore, receiving unfair offers results in activation in the ventrolateral and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices, structures that are involved in affective and cognitive regulation of emotion (Sanfey et al., 2003; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2012) . Additionally, the presentation of unfair offers is associated with activation of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, implicated in deliberate evaluation of self-interest (Gabay et al., 2014; Feng et al., 2015) . There is some evidence implicating fronto-insular regions in social processing in AUD. During a social exclusion task, individuals with AUD show higher insula activation and lower fronto-cortical activation, potentially reflecting an impairment in top-down regulation of emotionally salient impulses (Maurage et al., 2012) .
Three behavioral studies have reported that detoxified individuals with AUD reject unfair offers in the UG at a higher rate than healthy controls (HC), and this has been related to an increased sensitivity to unfairness in AUD (Brevers et al., 2013 (Brevers et al., , 2015 Tsukue et al., 2015) . Unfairness sensitivity has been interpreted as a possible contributing factor for having difficulties to cope with unfairness during social interactions, and under conditions that require regulation of emotionally motivated impulses. The increased sensitivity to unfairness has been suggested to represent an impaired regulatory mechanism of unfairness in social context and has been hypothetically linked to increased activity of the insula cortex. Importantly, the neural substrates associated with the UG in individuals with AUD remain unexamined. Here, we used fMRI to examine the neural activity underlying decision making during the UG in individuals with AUD and HC. Specifically, we hypothesized that insula activation would be higher in the AUD group when compared to the HC group during the presentation of unfair offers.
MATERIAL AND METHODS

Participants
Overall, 28 HC (20 males; mean age: 40.5) and 25 treatmentseeking AUD participants (18 males; mean age: 41) participated in the study. Due to excessive head motion one HC and two AUD subjects were excluded, resulting in a final sample of 27 HC and 23 AUD included in data analysis. The demographic and clinical data of participants are summarized in Table 1 . There were significant group differences in education and intelligence. Current Axis I comorbidity was higher in the AUD group (Table 1) .
For this IRB-approved study, HCs were recruited through advertisements in newspapers and other media. AUD participants were enrolled in the treatment program operated by the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism at the NIH and were recruited based on their eligibility for the study. After obtaining written informed consent, all participants underwent a comprehensive medical screen, including blood work, urinalysis, medical history, physical exam and a Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM Axis-I Disorders [SCID-IV; (First et al., 1996) ]. Inclusion criteria for all participants were: physically healthy, between 18 and 65 years of age and right-handed. Exclusion criteria were: positive HIV test, presence of ferromagnetic objects, active homicidal/suicidal ideation or currently receiving psychotropic medication. Women were excluded if they were pregnant or nursing. AUDs met DSM-IV-TR criteria for alcohol dependence, and were excluded if they had significant symptoms of alcohol withdrawal as determined by a Clinical Institutes Withdrawal Assessment-Alcohol revised [CIWAAr; (Sullivan et al., 1989) ] score of >8. HCs were excluded if they met current or past AUD criteria (abuse or dependence). On the day of the scan, participants' urine sample was screened for amphetamine, cocaine, benzodiazepines, opiates and cannabinoids. If positive, participants were excluded from participation.
Ultimatum game task
Before the scanning session, participants were told that the UG involves two players: a proposer who is tasked with splitting $20 between him/herself, and the responder who can either accept or reject the proposed offer. Accepting the offer meant that the participant and the proposer would receive the proposed $20 split while rejecting it meant that both would receive $0. Participants were informed that payment would be given for 10 randomly selected trials, but that they would earn at least $20 and no more than $80 (in addition, they were compensated $70 for their study participation). There was no significant group difference in the amount of money earned (P = 0.06; AUD group mean: $47.29, SD: $13.34; HC group mean: $45.33, SD: $13.14). In order to enhance the believability of the task, participants were informed that proposers were previous participants in this study and that they would be mailed payment for 10 randomly selected trials. Additionally, participants first played as proposers, making two anonymous offers, which they were told would be presented to future participants.
During the MR scan, the UG was projected onto a screen behind the scanner through a mirror attached to the head-coil. Participants made responses with their right hand using a two-button response pad. Participants played three 10-min runs of the UG. Each run consisted of 20 trials (Fig. 1a) . Participants played against 20 proposers twice and played against a computer for 20 trials. Face images for the proposer were obtained from the NimStim set (Tottenham et al., 2009 ). There were a picture of each of the 20 proposers (faces) and one picture for the computer. Proposer gender was split 50/50; in each gender 50% were white, 30% African American, 10% Asian and 10% Hispanic. These race ratios are representative of the demographics of our patient population. The order of proposers and offer amounts were intermixed and randomized across runs and participants (each run had at least 13 face offers and 6 computer offers). Each trial consisted of CUE (proposer picture: face or computer), OFFER ($20 split from proposer), CHOICE (decision time to accept or reject the offer) and FEEDBACK (reminder of how much money the proposer and the participant received based on the participant's decision to accept or reject the offer) periods.
Offer amounts ranged from a $1/$19 split to an even $10/$10 split. Each of the offer splits was presented six times. To conduct a categorical analysis, we defined offers of $1/$19 to $5/15 split as unfair and those of $6/$14 to $10/$10 as fair offers; this determination of fairness was done in accordance with previous UG literature (for a review, see Gabay et al., 2014) .
After the scan, participants filled out a questionnaire assessing if they felt that offers were unfair, and what motivated them to reject offers (unfairness, frustration and/or anger). The questionnaire also assessed whether or not participants believed that they were playing against real people as proposers. Finally, participants were debriefed; they were told that all offers they saw had been previously determined by computer pseudo-randomization (i.e. to make sure equal number of offers of each type), and that the offers they made as proposers would not be incorporated into the game.
Behavioral data analysis
We applied Student's t-tests and Fishers exact tests to compare AUD and HC groups on socio-demographic, smoking, drinking and measures (Table 1) . To be consistent with the literature, all UG runs were analyzed together by conducting a repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), with offer type as the within-subjects factor with two levels (unfair vs. fair), and group as the between subjects factor with two levels (HC vs. AUD) to measure group differences in offer type acceptance. The analysis of this study focused on the face offer trials. We did not include computer offers because they were represented by the same picture every time and the number of trials was only half of the face offers. A post hoc analysis of change in acceptance rate by run was evaluated by conducting a repeatedmeasures ANOVA using SAS PROC MIXED, with two withinsubjects factors, offer type (fair vs. unfair) and run (1, 2 or 3), and one between subjects factors, group (AUD vs. HC). The KenwardRoger correction was used, as its use is highly recommended in repeated-measures models with more complex covariance structures, especially when there is an unbalanced design. This correction often results in denominator degrees of freedom that are different than what would be obtained with traditional repeated-measures models. Analyses were run without covariates, and then again with covariates. Gender and years of education were the only variables (with significant between-group differences) included as covariates. The results were the same in both (i.e. with and without covariates) analyses. We did not include smoking or psychiatric diagnosis as covariates given that the majority of AUD were smokers with current co-morbid psychiatric diagnoses and the majority of HC were non-smokers without current psychiatric diagnoses (Table 1) .
Functional MRI data acquisition, processing and analysis
Structural (MPRAGE) and functional data were acquired using a Siemens 3 T Skyra scanner. Whole-brain functional data were collected with echo-planar imaging sequence (36 axial slices, 4 mm thickness, 64 × 64 matrix and repetition time of 2000 ms). We preprocessed and analyzed the MRI data using AFNI software package (Cox, 1996) . Large transients were removed through interpolation (AFNI's 3dDespike). Volumes were then slice-time corrected. All nuisance time series were de-trended. Nuisance variables for each voxel included the six parameter estimates for head motion. Timepoints with motion higher than 0.3 mm/deg were censored, and if a participant had a condition (regressor) of interest with more than 20% time-points censored then that participant was excluded from the analysis. One HC and two AUD subjects were excluded for head motion. There were no significant group differences when comparing for motion. Then we co-registered the functional EPI to the anatomical scan, resampled to 2-mm isotropic voxels, smoothed with an isometric 10-mm full-width-half-maximum Gaussian kernel, normalized by the mean signal intensity in each voxel to reflect percent-signal change, and transformed into the standardized Talairach volume for the purposes of group analyses (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988) .
Single-subject level analysis was performed using the following experimental conditions: CUE (proposer picture: face or computer), OFFER ($20 split from proposer), CHOICE (decision time to accept or reject the offer) and FEEDBACK (reminder of how much money the proposer and the participant received based on the participant's decision to accept or reject the offer). After generating the individual beta images, the OFFER experimental condition was further divided by its fairness (fair vs. unfair).
The individual β-coefficients calculated from the general linear model for each condition were entered into a second-level randomeffect factorial analysis using the AFNI multivariate modeling program 3dMVM (Chen et al., 2014) to test for group differences. As was conducted in the behavioral analysis, the group analysis was first analyzed with the three runs combined and then each run separately. All the results are based on the OFFER timepoint, made by faces, to be consistent with similar literature.
Correction for multiple comparisons across the whole brain was conducted using Monte-Carlo simulations run via 3dClustSim in AFNI v. 17.2.16, which computed the voxel-height threshold of a P-uncorrected value of 0.001 and a minimum cluster-size threshold of 7.4 voxels to obtain a 0.05 family wise error-corrected alpha value. For a general characterization of the brain regions involved in the UG task, we applied an additional more liberal voxel-height threshold of P = 0.01 and a cluster size of 20 which was required to obtain a FWE < 0.05 but given the recent views on the voxel-height threshold (Eklund et al., 2016 Nichols et al., 2017; Brown Trials initiated with a picture of a face or a computer; then the proposer's offer, splitting the $20 was presented. Participants made a response using a button box, and then received appropriate feedback for accepting or rejecting the offer. Each screen was displayed for 4-13.2 s with an inter-trial interval of 4-9.60 s. Rates for accepting offers by type all runs together (b) and by each run separate (c). In blue, the HC group and in red the AUD group. *Significant difference for the post hoc comparisons (P < 0.05).
and Behrmann, 2017; Cox et al., 2017a Cox et al., , 2017b , findings at this liberal threshold are reported as trends.
For the fair and unfair conditions, a region-of-interest (ROI) analysis was conducted on regions involved in unfairness evaluation during UG reported in recent fMRI metanalyses (Gabay et al., 2014; Feng et al., 2015) , to evaluate how the known brain regions involved in the UG task change by run. The following MNI coordinate were used to create ROI masks of 5-mm radius: right midanterior cingulate cortex (mACC: 
RESULTS
Behavioral results
Acceptance rates (all three runs combined) There was a significant main effect of offer type (F = 235.3, P < 0.0001) on acceptance rates. However, there was neither a significant group effect, nor a group × offer type interaction (Fig. 1b) . There was no systematic difference in believability of the task (the belief that the subject was playing against previous participants) between the two groups (t = 1.18, df = 46, P = 0.24).
Acceptance rates by run There were main effects of group (AUD > HC: F = 60.54, P < 0.0001), type of offer (fair > unfair: F = 1049.8, P < 0.0001) and run (F = 30.0, P < 0.0001) on acceptance rates. There was also a significant interaction of group by type by run (F = 17.5, P < 0.0001). Tukey post hoc tests indicated significant differences between AUD and HC in runs 1 and 2 under both offer types, but no differences in run 3 (Fig. 1c) , where AUD group accepted fair and unfair offers at higher rates compared to HC group in runs 1 and 2.
Whole-brain analysis neuroimaging results
Unfair vs. fair offers in HC (all three runs combined) We first validated that our UG task elicited differential activity in the aINS when comparing unfair vs. fair offers in HC. We found one significant cluster in the right precuneus and a trend cluster that included the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and aINS (Fig. 2 , Table 2 ). Higher activity in the left aINS and IFG during unfair offers compared to fair validates the UG task in the HC group.
Unfair vs. fair offers in AUD (all three runs combined)
We then contrasted unfair and fair offers in the AUD participants. Three clusters survived the multiple comparison correction (Fig. 2 and Table 2 ). All clusters were hypoactive in the unfair condition when compared to the fair condition. Hypoactive regions included bilateral areas of the lingual gyrus, cuneus and left declive. We did not find differential activity in the aINS, as seen in the HC group.
Unfair vs. fair offers between-group comparison
The direct comparison between groups for the unfair vs. fair contrast for the three combined runs did not reveal any significant clusters after multiple comparison correction. There were between-group differences in the whole-brain analysis by run for the unfair vs. fair contrast, but these differences were only at the trend level (Fig. 3) . Evidence of group differences in aINS activation was only present during run 3.
ROI neuroimaging results by run
There were main effects of run for the left (F = 57.05, P < 0.0001) and right (F = 25.5, P < 0.0001) aINS, but there was no effect of group. In the left mACC, there was a trend for a main effect of group (AUD > HC: F = 2.97, P = 0.089), and a significant effect of run (F = 96.69, P < 0.0001). The right mACC showed only a main effect of run (F = 7.42, P = 0.001). There was a main effect of run for the left cerebellum (F = 24.96, P < 0.0001), and right cerebellum (F = 16.93, P < 0.0001), with activation decreasing across the runs. We consider this cluster as a trend (only significant at liberal cluster search P-threshold of 0.01).
There was an interaction of group by type by run in the right cerebellum (F = 2.49, P < 0.025). In AUD only, there were significant differences between runs 2 and 3, in both fair and unfair conditions. There were only a main effect of run for the left IFG (F = 33.8, P < 0.0001), left SMA (F = 67.54, P < 0.0001) and left IPL (F = 3.92, P < 0.023). Despite no evidence of significant group differences, all ROIs showed a pattern of decreasing activation across the runs during unfair offers (Figs 4, S2 and S3) . This decreasing activation across runs was also evident within each group in the whole-brain analysis (Fig. S1 ).
DISCUSSION
We conducted a study to explore the neural correlates of the UG in AUD. Unexpectedly, we did not find between-group behavioral differences in the combined analysis. Conversely, we did find group differences in acceptance and rejection rates between runs. To our knowledge, this is the first time that a significant interaction was found between group, offer type and run, such that AUD accepted a greater number of unfair offers during the first and second runs, compared to HC. There were no significant group differences in the neural correlates of receiving unfair offers compared to fair offers. Behaviorally, one expectation was that each group would have a similar behavior independent of the task run; the AUD group had similar acceptance rate for each of the three runs. However, the HC group had a very low acceptance rate for unfair offers in the first two runs that increased drastically in the third run. We contemplate that this behavioral difference may be explained by a different contextualization of the task by each group. We speculate that by the third run, the HC group realized that the offers were not improve from a $10/10 split, and thus increased their acceptance of unfair offers; whereas the AUD group was more consistent in their acceptance of unfair offers across the three runs, void of the additional learning-cognitive processing exhibited by HC.
Further, we hypothesized that the AUD group would accept fewer unfair offers, but in the present study we did not replicate the behavioral differences previously reported, i.e. higher rate of rejecting unfair offers by AUD (Brevers et al., 2013 (Brevers et al., , 2015 Tsukue et al., 2015) . Several methodological differences are likely to account for this discrepancy. Our design was typical of fMRI studies that have used the UG, and allowed 4-13.2 s each for the offer and the choice periods, with an inter-trial interval of 4-9.6 s. In contrast, Brevers and colleagues presented the offer and the choice together for a fixed duration of 3 s, and the inter-trial interval was much shorter, 500ms. This design is not suitable for an fMRI study, and results in a higher cognitive load, which is likely to differentially affect AUD and HC. Furthermore, Brevers (Brevers et al., 2013 (Brevers et al., , 2015 used a variable sum of money to be split, while a fixed amount has been standard in prior studies. The variable sum results in a need for a calculation to establish the fairness of the proposed amount on each trial, and adds to the cognitive load. Additionally, the parametric coverage of 'the fairness spectrum' was much less dense and skewed toward the less unfair extreme, with unfair offers that, applied to our $20 total, would only correspond to $3.40, $4.00 or $4.40. Finally, the previous studies involving UG and AUD patients did not offer any monetary compensation directly related to the task outcome, which may have influenced their overall rates of acceptance and rejection.
Despite many studies reporting significant activations in response to unfair offers (reviewed in Gabay et al., 2014; Feng et al., 2015) , we found relatively small and weak results in both the within-and between-group comparisons for the unfair vs. fair contrast. Three possible factors may explain this; first, is the arbitrary classification of fair and unfair offers. As seen in the meta-analysis of functional studies of the UG (Gabay et al., 2014) , the range of what it is considered unfair varies among studies. It is important to highlight that the determination of the optimal fair/unfair ratio is an ongoing area of research (Schuster, 2017) . Our participants in both groups considered offers up to $8 dollars from the $20 dollar split as unfair, as evidenced by our post-task questionnaire. Additionally, the neural substrates underlying the fair offers were as strong and significant as the unfair offers, which explains the weak results of the within-group unfair vs. fair results. Supporting this view, a recent paper from the Sanfey group defined unfair as offerings of less than half of the total amount (Grecucci et al., 2013) .
Additionally, the effect of run seen in the ROI analysis (Fig. 4 ) and the whole-brain analysis (Figure S1 ), demonstrated a linear decrease of activity in regions involved in the UG as the exposure to unfairness increased. This may suggest a physiological habituation process that has been proposed for repetitive emotional presentation (Codispoti et al., 2016; Mastria et al., 2017) . Lastly, the hypothetical behavioral difference in task strategy mentioned above may have influenced our neuroimaging findings. The significant right precuneus activity together with the trends in the IFG and aINS indicates possible emotion regulation (Grecucci et al., 2013) in the HC group; the bilateral cuneus findings in the AUD group may indicate a more automatic processing.
Activation in the aINS was markedly attenuated by increased exposure to fair and unfair offers in both AUD and HC groups. Between-group differences in aINS activation were only present during the third run, where no between-group behavioral differences were observed. Our finding of a functional deficit in insula activity during the third run of the UG is consistent with the recent report that insula perfusion is impaired in alcoholism (Sullivan et al., 2013) , and our own findings of aINS atrophy in this condition (Senatorov et al., 2015) . The absence of this effect in the first and second runs seems to be influenced by the differential behavioral group performance.
Given that the goal of this study was to test the hypothesis that the brain activity during the UG was different in AUD compared to HC, obtaining no statistical difference in behavioral performance Fig. 3 . Between-group analysis AUD > HC for the unfair vs. fair contrast at each run. All these clusters survived correction (FWE < 0.05) for multiple comparisons but because of the liberal P-threshold cluster search of 0.01, we consider these as trends.
between groups during the third run allows us to identify brain circuitry in AUDs that compensates for the functions accomplished by HC. With behavioral differences present in the first and second run, it is difficult to evaluate if the differential brain activity is a true brain circuitry difference, a consequence of increased unfairness exposure, or a difference in cognitive strategies.
We embarked on this study based on a simple hypothesis based on a numerous of studies reporting that activity of the insula not only correlates with the intensity of self-reported cravings (reviewed in Naqvi and Bechara, 2009 ) but also to social stressors (Eisenberger, 2012) , that in general are considered major relapse triggers (Brownell et al., 1986; Witkiewitz and Marlatt, 2004) . Furthermore, higher insula activity in response to social exclusion was recently reported in detoxified AUD (Maurage et al., 2012) . Under this framework, our hypothesis of AUD being associated with higher activity of the aINS to aversive social stimuli was very appealing; however this hypothesis was contradicted by the data. Instead, we obtained diametrically opposite and potentially more interesting results.
The relationship between insula activity and behavioral responses in the UG is subject to vigorous debate (Gospic et al., 2011) . At a minimum, our results demonstrate that under some conditions, rejection or acceptance of offers in the UG as a function of their fairness cannot be isolated to only insula activity, but to its interactions with other regions responsible for additional functions, including feelings, empathy and risk processing (Singer et al., 2009 ). This highlights the established role of the aINS as a key node within a salience network that facilitates switching between networks when appropriate (Menon and Uddin, 2010) , including value-based decision making (Bartra et al., 2013) . Despite its important role, the attenuated aINS activity in the AUD group did not prevent AUD from performing the UG task at the same level as HC during the third run.
Limitations
This study has several limitations, which should be considered. One major limitation of this study is the presence of psychiatric comorbidity in the AUD group. Psychiatric comorbidities introduce further heterogeneity into the AUD group. Further, the AUD group had higher rates of smoking and lower levels of education. However, psychiatric comorbidities and high rates of smoking in AUD are highly prevalent, particularly in individuals seeking inpatient treatment. Another limitation of this study was not being able to use the computer offers as a comparison due to the unbalanced design constraints. One constraint was that the same picture of a computer was used for all computer offers, compared to 20 different pictures for the face offers; the other constraint was that the number of computer offers was only half of the face offers. Lastly, this study has a relatively small sample size, which limits the generalization of these results.
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